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Abstract. The provision of free healthcare is increasingly advocated as a way to improve access to health ser-
vices for vulnerable population groups. However, decision makers are still short of factual data about the effects 
of payment exemptions (free provision) where they have already been introduced, and on the impact of different 
forms of implementation in French-speaking countries of West Africa.
In the South of Mali, two types of free healthcare for children under 5 have been introduced: i) initially, a partial 
exemption, covering only the rapid diagnosis and treatment of malaria, and ii) subsequently total exemption for 
all primary healthcare. The partial exemption was irst implemented by an NGO in a single district, then scaled 
up by the Ministry of Health on a nationwide scale.
Following the partial exemption, health center attendance increased from 0.3 annual consultations per child, to 
0.5, and then to 1.8 when total exemption was introduced. The rises in attendance were immediate and lasting for 
all health centers, whether implemented by the NGO or by the government. Attendance during the rainy season 
was multiplied by 1.5 after the government-organized partial exemption. Statistical analysis shows that if the 
government alone (without NGO) were to bring in 100% free healthcare for children, it could increase health 
center attendance by a factor in the order of 4.
Keywords: malaria, free healthcare, exemption from payment, NGO intervention, scaling up, health center at-
tendance, children under ive
1. Introduction
Several African countries have experimented with or adopted 
policies implementing the partial or total exemption from the 
payment of healthcare charges, with the aim of improving 
access to healthcare for vulnerable population groups. 
Reliable data on the evaluation of these experiences are 
scarce, however, particularly for the countries of French-
speaking West Africa (Meessen & al., 2011; Ridde & 
Morestin, 2010).
In the district of Kangaba in the South of Mali, the NGO 
Médecins Sans Frontières, Centre Opérationnel de Bruxelles 
(MSF-OCB) has initially supported seven out of eleven com-
munity health centers (CScom – Centre de santé communau-
taire) by organizing the exemption of healthcare fees for chil-
dren aged between 0 and 4. The exemption started in 2005 
and was initially limited to cases of malaria. It covered a 
rapid diagnostic test (RDT) and a course of artemisinine-
based combination therapy (ACT). We refer to this exemp-
tion as “free ACT”. At the end of 2006, the exemption was 
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extended to all healthcare for children under ive. Then, in 
2007, the Ministry of Health in turn made ACT free for un-
der-ives throughout the country, including the four Kangaba 
district CScoms not yet covered by the NGO. Finally, in 
2008, the NGO extended its activities to include the latter 
CScom, also dispensing totally free care to under-ives at 
these centers. At the same time, it modiied its way of reim-
bursing the CScoms. 
Evaluating this series of interventions is a challenge, as the 
interventions overlapped or closely followed one another. At 
the same time, however, the variations in mode of interven-
tion within the same context provide a rare opportunity for 
evaluation: they can be used to measure not just the overall 
effect of the interventions, but also the robustness of the ef-
fects when exposed to a range of different factors. This en-
ables us to break down the overall effect into two compo-
nents: one linked speciically to the exemption from payment, 
and one linked to the presence of an NGO with a room for 
maneuver differing from that of the government.
To shed further light on this variation within the interven-
tion district, we have selected a comparison district, namely 
Selingué. It is situated next to Kangaba and did not beneit 
from the intervention of the NGO. Thanks to the quarterly 
statistics reported by each CScom, we have comparative data 
before and after the intervention as well as with and without 
intervention.
2. History of interventions
The partial exemption of payment for RDTs and ACT as well 
as the total exemption were introduced by the NGO as part of 
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Figure 2. Sequence of interventions by area 
The shaded bands mark the 3rd quarters (July to September), i.e. the start of the peak malaria transmission season, and the peak of CScom 
attendance by children under ive.
Figure 1. Map of intervention and comparison areas
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its “Malaria Project”. The project was motivated by the goal 
of reducing malaria-related mortality and morbidity, rather 
than experimenting with different forms of free healthcare. 
However, the partial exemption was subsequently made total 
when the NGO realized that the partial exemption failed to 
reach a majority of malaria cases (MSF, 2008; 2010). 
We describe below the successive changes that occurred in 
the CScoms of the intervention and comparison districts 
(Figure 2). The NGO initially selected only seven out of the 
eleven Kangaba district CScoms to roll out its interventions, 
because the remaining four were hard to reach.
2.1 Free ACT provided by the NGO
Faced with heightened resistance to chloroquine, the Ministry 
of Health decided in March 2005 to adopt artemisinine-based 
combination therapy (ACT). MSF offered to support the pro-
cess of change in anti-malaria strategy. Starting in August 
2005, the NGO supplied TDRs free of charge for all patients, 
and ACT treatment for children under ive. The consultation 
itself, however, had still to be paid for and patients aged 5 
years and over were charged a ixed tariff of FCFA 85 
(USD 0.17) per ACT treatment.
At the start of the intervention in 2005, the permanent MSF 
team consisted of one doctor and one nurse, but was doubled 
in 2006 to cope with the increased supervisory workload. The 
team did not directly dispense healthcare, but organized the 
training and supervision of health workers, CScom adminis-
trative staff and management committees. A protocol was set 
up for the use of ACT and the healthcare workers were trained 
in its application. The local population was informed about 
the innovation at three meetings organized at each CScom, to 
which two representatives from each village were invited. 
The dificulties encountered with this intervention were the 
understanding of the RDT – the use of which was new to the 
healthcare workers – and the restocking of CScom pharma-
cies to avoid shortages of RDTs and ACT treatments. 
For the patients, the exemption was conditional on diagno-
sis. If the RDT was negative, the test remained free of charge, 
but the patients had to pay for the prescribed treatment. 
Although the symptoms of malaria are well-known to the 
population and the probability of a malaria attack is high, at 
least during the peak transmission season (July to December), 
the possibility of the patient having a non-malarial febrile ill-
ness is very real: 23% of children with fever tested negative 
during the peak transmission season and 30%, during the low 
transmission season.1 Users could therefore not be sure of 
getting free treatment until they had taken the RDT.
Following this initial intervention, healthcare quality and 
service utilization improved. However, the NGO became 
aware that many children suffering from malaria still did not 
have access to treatment. It therefore decided to remove i-
nancial barriers by making all healthcare for children under 
1  From August to December 2005, 79% of the children were given an 
RDT and 77% tested positive (thus, 23% were negative, calculation 
based on MSF, 2006a). From January to June 2006, by contrast, 37% 
were given an RDT and 70% were positive (MSF, 2006b). The percent-
age of conirmed malaria cases was therefore 61% during the peak trans-
mission period and 26% during the low transmission season.
ive free (see next section). It also sought to act on the geo-
graphical barrier for certain irst-line treatments in the more 
remote villages (see the “Agents palu” section).
2.2 Total exemption provided by the NGO
The objective of the total exemption was to reduce malaria-
related mortality and morbidity. As from December 2006, all 
treatments for children under ive became free of charge 
(MSF, 2010), regardless of the health problem (malaria or 
otherwise). For these freely dispensed procedures, the man-
agement committees (“ASACOs”) were given a inancial 
compensation of FCFA 1,000 for each new curative consulta-
tion. These measures were still limited to the seven initial 
CScoms in the program. 
Two 3-day workshops were organized to train the health-
care workers, notably in differential diagnosis of malaria and 
respiratory infections. The ministry’s diagnostic and thera-
peutic protocols were simpliied. Supervisory visits to health-
care workers and CScom administrators were organized on a 
twice-monthly basis, much more frequently than foreseen by 
the public system (monthly visits for the irst six months after 
the opening of a center, and quarterly visits thereafter). The 
two main constraints identiied for personnel training are, 
irstly, the large proportion of CScoms directed by nurses 
who are auxiliary inirmiers brevetés rather than by the state-
registered inirmiers d’Etat, and secondly, the mobility of 
healthcare workers. The administrative personnel, mean-
while, now had to manage not only the two items required by 
the partial exemption, but all of the essential irst-line drugs 
for children. Anticipating stock shortages and planning for 
preventive supplies required a great deal more attention. The 
ministry’s management system was applied, however, the 
NGO obtained supplies not from the national purchasing 
agency, but via its own supply chain.
2.3 “Agents palu” for remote villages during the 
peak transmission season
The accessibility of CScoms for people living in villages 
more than ive km away was limited or even non-existent 
during the rainy season. In mid-2007, observing a high inci-
dence of advanced-stage malaria among patients who had 
traveled long distances, the NGO began recruiting villagers 
who could read and write, to act as “Agents palu” (village 
malaria workers). They were trained to diagnose and treat 
simple malaria cases with RDTs/ACT and to refer RDT-
negative or serious cases to the CScom. The Agent palu strat-
egy focused on children under 10 and was limited, on one 
hand, to the period from July to December (the “peak trans-
mission” season), and on the other, to villages located at least 
5 km away from the nearest CScom. On average, each Agent 
palu had to cover three villages and was paid FCFA 25,000 a 
month ($50).
2.4 Free ACT provided by the government 
In July 2007, the Ministry of Health introduced free RDT and 
ACT provision across the country, including the four CScoms 
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in Kangaba district where the NGO was not yet operating. 
The national strategy is equally aimed at children under ive, 
and uses a diagnostic and therapeutic guide similar to the one 
deployed by the NGO, and used the experience gained by the 
NGO. Compared to the NGO implementation, the target pop-
ulation of the national strategy received less information; the 
message about fee exemption is thought to have been publi-
cized solely on local radio. District pharmacies recorded fre-
quent shortages of RDTs and ACT, often lasting up to 4 
months a year. Supervision and training were less intense 
than with the NGO.
Although the national strategy was implemented in four 
CScoms of the district where the NGO had been operating for 
two years, there was little exchange between the district 
health management team (public system) and the NGO team. 
The supply chains remained separate and ACT provision in 
the NGO’s seven CScoms remained part of the overall free 
healthcare plan. For the four remaining Kangaba district 
CScoms, the implementation of the national strategy was 
therefore inluenced little, if at all, by the presence of the 
NGO. Only the workload of the district health management 
team was diminished, because they had to deal with only four 
of their eleven CScoms.
2.5 Fixed-rate reimbursement, replaced by a 
performance-related system
Initially, the CScom management committees were given a 
ixed-rate reimbursement of FCFA 1,000 by the NGO for 
each free consultation. This compensation was intended to 
cover the salaries and running costs of the CScoms. The au-
tomatic and unchanging amount was agreed before the pro-
gram began, aiming to keep the CScoms operational. But it 
was calculated knowing neither the real costs, nor their sea-
sonal variation, nor their variation per volume of patients 
seen. The amount turned out to have been over-estimated 
(Jouquet, 2007) and a modiication of the CScom compensa-
tion system became desirable in order to link compensation 
to performance.
Starting in February 2008, the compensation payment was 
broken down into a minimum amount to cover the health cen-
ter running costs2 and a set of bonuses awarded on the basis 
of a monthly performance evaluation. Checks were made on 
whether health workers had maintained a continuous pres-
ence, on whether the prescriptions matched the diagnoses, on 
the management of the CScom drug store, on proper book-
keeping, on the completeness and regularity of the monthly 
statistical report, on the management committee’s handling 
of the accounts, and on the record and regularity of internal 
and community meetings (MSF, 2009). This performance-
checking was initially perceived by the personnel as unusual 
and as a form of “inspection”. However, after a process of 
adaptation, the various staff members were increasingly suc-
cessful in meeting the criteria and earning their bonuses, and 
the system came to be accepted. 
2  The ixed amount includes the remuneration of CScom staff accord-
ing to the salaries paid by the ASACOs, plus an amount to cover the 
running costs, based on the average monthly amount for 2007 augment-
ed by 20%.
2.6 Extension of the program to the remaining 
CScoms in Kangaba district 
In 2008, the NGO integrated the district’s four remaining 
CScoms into its program. The sole “Group 2” CScom (see 
Figures 1 & 2), located behind a mountain at the western end 
of the district, began dispensing free healthcare in January 
2008. Group 3 – the three CScoms located entirely on the 
other side of the river – started in July 2008. Due to the bar-
rier of the river, implementation was administered by a new 
team formed by the NGO and based in Selingué, geographi-
cally closer. The new team was made up of a member of the 
existing team project and a new recruit.
Unlike Group 1, where the innovations were introduced 
one by one, the whole set of measures was put in place at the 
same time in the new health centers supported by the NGO: 
free ACT, until then implemented by the public system, was 
integrated into the overall free provision offered by the NGO; 
the RDTs and ACT medications were now sourced from the 
NGO’s stores. Total exemption was brought in with perfor-
mance evaluation, Agents palu were put in place, and training 
was dispensed at a single workshop.
The health workers and administrators of these CScoms 
are reported to have complained that they had not beneited 
beforehand from the ixed-rate compensation of FCFA 1,000 
per consultation (which was advantageous for the CScoms). 
The management committees did not take the initiative of 
convening meetings additional to those organized by the 
NGO, unlike what had been observed in Group 1.
3. Method of evaluation
We use the routine data recorded at each CScom. The month-
ly numbers of consultations of under-ives were extracted 
from the quarterly reports of the two districts. The data were 
extracted twice and independently, to correct input errors. 
The data constitute a time series for each CScom extending 
from January 2003 to December 2009, based on the reports 
that could still be retrieved (94%). 
The choice of the comparison district was made in 2010, 
and therefore inluenced neither the intervention nor the data 
collection. One of the CScoms (Karan, Group 1) had to be 
excluded from the analysis because of its inconsistent popu-
lation numbers. 
The visual and statistical analyses of the graphs follow the 
recommendations of Shadish et al. (2002). The statistical 
analysis uses multi-level regression to evaluate the contribu-
tion of each form of exemption to health service utilization, 
and to factor in differences of context between health centers 
(e.g. presence or absence of the NGO, of a doctor, of a hospi-
tal (CSréf), of rural maternity services, and the share of the 
population living a long way from the CScom). The modeling 
and interpretation of the results are based on the intervention 
history and on information from project team members. 
We apply negative binomial models with random effects 
representing unobserved characteristics of the CScoms and 
control for serial autocorrelation (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; 
Singer & Willet, 2002; Verbeke & Molenbergh, 2005; 
Lagarde, 2011). The predicted rates of Figure 4 are obtained 
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using the post-estimation function available in SAS 9.2.
In the negative binomial models, we treat the size of the 
target population (i.e. the numbers of children under ive in 
each area) as the denominator (offset) of the dependent vari-
able (i.e. the CScoms’ monthly consultation numbers). This 
enables us to simultaneously model these numbers (Figure 3) 
and the utilization rates (Figure 4). In turn, there is no coef-
icient produced for the size of the target population; rather its 
inluence on attendance is fully accounted for by the offset 
and the direct modeling of rates.
4. Results 
4.1 Immediate, homogeneous and lasting increases 
in attendance
The analysis of the graphs shows that total exemption has a 
large effect on health center attendance. Figure 3 presents the 
monthly averages per group and month, as predicted by the 
regression model. The complete information is contained in 
the time series observed per CScom and month (Figure A.1 in 
the appendix).
The increases occur in the month where total exemption is 
introduced, i.e. immediately, although the periods of intro-
duction vary from one group to another. This uniformity of 
reaction, despite the differences in years and seasons of pro-
gram inception, is a key argument for attributing the increas-
es to the advent of free provision. The other item of evidence 
is that the comparison district shows no such increase.
One can also observe an immediate effect of free ACT (as 
provided by the NGO and by the government), although the 
effect of total exemption largely dominates the picture and 
determines the scale, making the effect of the partial exemp-
tion look small. The effect of the partial exemption is primar-
ily seen during the peak malaria transmission season, from 
July to December. It is more marked, however, in presence 
of the NGO in Group 1.
The homogeneity of these effects is striking. In Figure 
A.1, there are no CScoms that fail to show an increase as a 
result of the exemption. When ACT treatments alone are 
free, attendance falls during the low malaria transmission 
season (January to June). With total exemption, by contrast, 
attendance remains up all year round. The homogeneity in 
showing an immediate reaction does not, of course, prevent 
the CScoms from differing substantially in terms of the size 
of that reaction (see Figure A.1; part of these differences 
between CScoms can be explained by the results of the 
regression). 
Note that Group 3 is the only one that does not show the 
full upward spike during the irst peak malarial season fol-
lowing the introduction of total fee exemption (see the cir-
cle in Figure 3). The start of total exemption coincided with 
the beginning of the peak transmission season in 2008. 
CScom attendance rises immediately but, in the rainy sea-
son, only just reaches the level of the next low transmission 
season, January to June 2009. However, as from the second 
year of application of total exemption, the Group 3 atten-
dance behaves like the rest of the district, with a distinct 
spike during the months from July to December. As men-
tioned earlier, this group of CScoms is hard to reach, and the 
implementation was managed by a new team from outside 
the district.
The rises in attendance are sustained during the observa-
tion period. The effect of free national ACT treatments was 
stable over the two and a half years of monitoring in the 
comparison district, during which time the measure was not 
incorporated into the NGO’s total exemption scheme. As for 
the total exemption, the observed and predicted curves both 
give the impression of an upward trend.
The absolute numbers of children consulted – between 20 
and 50 per month before the interventions (Figure 3) – rise 
by several dozens upon introduction of free ACT and reach 
at least 200 under total exemption. However, the seasonal 
highs during the peak transmission season exceed 400, and 
in the two Group 1 centers with a doctor, the igures ap-
proach the 1,000 mark.
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Figure 3. Evolution of health center 
attendance
Average numbers of  monthly consul-
tations of under-ives for the three 
groups of CScoms in the NGO pro-
gram and for the comparison district, 
as predicted by the regression model. 
The predictions include the signii-
cant effects described in Section 4.2. 
The graph of the comparison district 
is shown in black, those of the NGO 
intervention areas in color. The long 
and slimmer arrows indicate the start 
of free ACT provision, the short and 
thicker arrows the start of total ex-
emption. The circle represents the 
slow startup of Group 3 (see text).
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4.2 Determinants of health center utilization
As with the preceding analysis of the graph curves, the ef-
fects that stand out from the results of the statistical modeling 
are that of total exemption (multiplying attendance by be-
tween 3.1 and 6.1, see section 4.4) and the seasonal variation 
on the effect of free ACT (between 1.1 and 1.9). Other ef-
fects, less or not at all visible in the curves, are nonetheless 
statistically signiicant and were included in the model: 
• The peak malaria transmission season multiplies 
CScom attendance on average by 1.332 (95% coni-
dence interval: 1.201–1.478);
• The presence of a doctor multiplies attendance in the 
July-December period by a factor of 1.264 (1.030–
1.550). This suggests that the capacities and resources 
available at the corresponding CScoms play a key 
role, whether in facilitating the management of patient 
overlows, or in enhancing the relative attractiveness 
of centers (two CScoms in Group 1 and three in the 
comparison district had a doctor);
• The presence of a hospital (CSréf) in the area of a 
CScom diminishes its attendance by a factor of 0.708 
(0.523–0.960);
• If the delivery of free ACT is accompanied by the 
NGO, its effect on attendance multiplies by 1.261 
(0.969–1.642)3, on top of the preceding effects4.
Other factors were tested, but proved to be non-signiicant:
• The proportion of the target population living more 
than 5 km away from the CScom (on the size of the 
total population, see Section 3);
• The presence of a rural maternity service in the area of 
the CScom;
• The introduction of Agents palu;
• The replacement in Group 1 of ixed-rate reimburse-
ment by performance-related bonuses.
4.3 Utilization rates per child, with and without 
exemption
Figure 4 presents the annualized utilization rates5 according 
3  Unlike the previous estimates, this one is based on short periods: free 
ACT provision was observed with the NGO from mid-2005 to end 2006 
in Group 1, and without the NGO from mid-2007 in the comparison 
district (only very briely in Groups 2 and 3). Whence the relatively 
large conidence interval.
4  All of the effects apply independently. For example: during the peak 
season, attendance is multiplied by a factor of 1.33; in the CScoms with 
a doctor, utilization increases by a further 1.26, so that these CScoms see 
their attendance multiplied by 1.33 x 1.26 = 1.68. Likewise for the effect 
of free ACT and its delivery (or not) by the NGO.
5  An annualized rate of e.g. 1.44 (Figure 4, Group 1 with total exemp-
tion, low season) means that a child in these areas would visit the CScom 
on average 1.44 times a year, if the rate remained constant over the year. 
But as this rate represents the 1st half-year while the rate for the 2nd half 
is 2.06, the average annual number of consultations per child works out 
at 1.44/2 + 2.06/2 = 0,72 + 1,03 = 1.75.
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to the regression model, for the low and peak malaria trans-
mission seasons. The rate per child represents the perspec-
tive of the target population and its effective access to the 
CScom, while the absolute number of consultations per 
CScom (Figure 3) represents the perspective of the service 
and its workload. The predicted rates account for the inlu-
ence of the factors identiied above and control for the long-
term trend in attendance.
With regard to free ACT, it is clearer here that it acted 
mainly on attendance from July to December. Only in Group 
1 – with NGO support – do we ind a rise in attendance dur-
ing the low transmission season (small arrow). Also, the in-
crease during the peak transmission season is more pro-
nounced. In low and in peak seasons alike, the rates for 
Group 1 during the free ACT stage are distinctly higher than 
in the other zones. The latter are situated at the lower coni-
dence limits of Group 1, indicating that the additional effect 
in Group 1 is almost statistically signiicant, despite the 
short period of observation (see note, Section 4.2).
Turning to total exemption, we observe a “catch-up” ef-
fect in Groups 2 and 3. They attain rates equivalent to those 
of Group 1, although their basic rate, and their rate during 
partial exemption, were distinctly lower. It seems that the 
“NGO factor” not only made up for the difference observed 
between national policy and the NGO intervention, it also 
compensated for the “dificulty” of these areas, which pre-
viously recorded rates lower than both Group 1 and the 
comparison district.
m
u
lt
ip
lic
at
io
n
 e
ff
ec
t
Jan.-June July-Dec.
free ACTs, 
by GOVERNMENT
free ACTs, 
by NGO
1.53
1.37
1.93
Jan.-June July-Dec.
1.09
Figure 5. Effects of free ACT with the NGO or by the government
These effects are controlled for and net of  the signiicant factors de-
scribed in Section 4.2.
4.4 Effect of partial and total exemptions with the 
NGO or by the government
Figure 5 compares the effects of the two free ACT implemen-
tations observed6: 
• Free ACT provided solely by the government (Figure 
6  All of the effects presented in this section apply to an average CScom 
(based on the 17 CScoms in the study); they apply on top of the other 
effects listed in Section 4.2.
5, left) multiplied CScom service utilization in the 
peak transmission season (July-December) by a factor 
of 1.5 on average. During the low transmission season 
(January-June), however, we ind little or no signii-
cant effect (factor of 1.09);
• Free ACT supported by the NGO (Figure 5, right) 
multiplied CScom utilization during the peak period 
by a factor of approximately 2. Only in the context of 
NGO support we ind a signiicant effect also during 
the low transmission season (factor of 1.4).
Figure 6 uses the effect difference found between the two free 
ACT implementations and compares expected effects of total 
fee exemption of underives’ healthcare, according to three 
scenarios. The three estimates address different practical 
questions:
• Additional effect of total exemption when following 
on from free ACT provision: we observed the effects 
of total exemption only when it was added to the ex-
emption from payment for ACT treatment, which was 
already having an impact on attendance. This transi-
tion from partial to total exemption multiplied CScom 
attendance by a factor of 3.0 during the peak transmis-
sion season, and by a factor of 4.4 during the low 
transmission season (Figure 6, left). The difference of 
effect between the two seasons may seem surprising, 
but we should remember that free ACT provision had 
already increased peak-season attendance by a factor 
of 1.5 (taking the estimate without NGO). The calcu-
lations performed for this irst scenario enable us to 
estimate the increase in attendance expected if the 
public health system of Mali were to extend its pro-
gram of partial exemption (free ACT is already gener-
alized) to the total exemption for irs-line treatment of 
children. However, as will be discussed, this estimate 
represents an upper bound. The estimate assumes, of 
course, that such an extension would use strategies 
like those observed in Kangaba, notably as regards re-
imbursement. It excludes the NGO effect in order to 
provide a more realistic approximation of the impact 
achievable by the public health system under “nor-
mal” conditions of implementation.
• Overall effect: the regression model compares the at-
tendance observed during total exemption with the 
level that would have been found without any exemp-
tion. This comparison yields an overall increase in at-
tendance by a factor of approximately 4.7 (Figure 6, 
center). Again, this estimate represents an upper 
bound. This second scenario enables other countries 
to estimate the increase in attendance if they were to 
organize total exemption from the outset, without an 
initial phase of partial exemption, and using similar 
strategies in a similar context. Once again, the NGO-
speciic effect is excluded from the effect estimate.
• Overall pilot project effect: by inally factoring in the 
NGO effect, we obtain the overall effect of total ex-
emption as observed in Kangaba district in presence 
R. Heinmüller et al: Free healthcare provision with an NGO or by the Malian government – Impact on health center attendance by children under ive
8 Field Actions Science Reports
of the NGO. This effect estimate includes aspects that 
go beyond free healthcare provision, such as the pres-
ence of an outside organization capable of focusing 
substantial human and material resources on a few se-
lected CScoms, without necessarily following nation-
al recruitment and supply circuits. The overall pilot 
project effect is of course greater, increasing CScom 
utilization by a factor of approximately 6.0 (Figure 6, 
right). This inal scenario may be of interest to NGOs, 
project sponsors or governments planning a similar 
program, to demonstrate the effects of exemption in 
the context of a controlled pilot project.
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Figure 6. Effects of total exemption under three scenarios
These effects are controlled for and net of the signiicant factors de-
scribed in Section 4.2.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The immediate and lasting increases in health center atten-
dance following the introduction of both partial and total ex-
emption indicate that the elimination of inancial barriers is 
effective in addressing previously unmet needs. This is prom-
ising: better health center utilization can be expected to have 
a positive inluence on under-ive mortality and morbidity 
(Rutherford & al., 2010). Additionally, the NGO conducted a 
study in mid-2008 on under-ive mortality in the areas of 
Group 1, covering six months of free ACT and seven months 
of total exemption, as well as an area without these interven-
tions. The study found signs of reduced mortality among un-
der-ives in the intervention zone (Ponsar & al., 2011).
The stability of the positive effects of government-orga-
nized free ACT provision is particularly encouraging, espe-
cially during the peak malaria transmission season. It attests 
to the viability and relevance of this intervention within a 
public health system and without NGO support. It also sug-
gests that the quality of public health services as they cur-
rently stand is accepted by the population, so long as they are 
inancially accessible: we should not forget that there is a 
consultation charge – only the ACT treatments are free. 
Quality is compromised primarily by shortages of RDTs and 
ACT, which are still locally out of stock for up to four months 
a year. Even if CScom attendance in the state-run context has 
increased less than in the context of NGO intervention with 
total exemption, it is reasonable to assume that relatively 
more serious malaria cases have beneited, which should re-
sult in a positive impact on morbidity and mortality across 
the nation.
The large effect difference between partial exemption, tar-
geted at malaria, and total exemption highlights the ambigu-
ity inherent in exemptions that are conditional on a diagnosis 
that cannot be known in advance: potential users are unsure 
of being exempted from payment, and thus weigh up their 
chances before they consult, especially when cases do not – 
or not yet – appear serious enough for the children’s mothers 
to cover several kilometers on foot.
The substantial overall effect of total exemption on atten-
dance conirms the potential of this intervention. With a rate 
of 2 consultations per year and child during the peak trans-
mission season, and 1.5 during the low season, it not only has 
the potential to reach a large proportion of malaria cases, but 
also respiratory infections and severe diarrheas, thus helping 
to reduce general mortality and morbidity in the target group.
The monthly peaks of up to 1,000 child consultations per 
CScom (Figure A.1) show that the healthcare personnel was 
able to cope with the additional workload. In Group 1, the 
workload in the peak transmission season went from an aver-
age of 7 consultations per health worker per day, prior to the 
intervention of the NGO, to an average of 21 consultations 
per health worker per day following the introduction of total 
exemption for under-ives (Jouquet, 2007 & 2008). The staff 
workload was therefore multiplied by 3. With total exemp-
tion, the situation moved from one of under-utilization to nor-
mal utilization of medical personnel. The same ability to ab-
sorb additional workload has been observed in two districts 
in Burkina Faso that experimented with total exemption for 
under-ives (Ly et al., 2012).
The effect of the partial and total exemptions has proved to 
be robust in several ways:
• The homogeneous reaction in all the areas where they 
were implemented suggests a certain robustness with 
regard to differing local contexts. 
• The effect of total exemption was unchanged after the 
reform of the compensation system, which abolished a 
ixed-rate system – one that was very advantageous 
for the management committees – in favor of perfor-
mance evaluations, which the personnel had dificulty 
accepting.
• The effect of total exemption was also robust with re-
gard to accelerated implementation and shorter train-
ing times in Groups 2 and 3. The Group 3 implementa-
tion, moreover, was managed by a new team working 
out of a new project ofice.
The available data do not enable us to assess whether – as 
was observed in Burkina Faso (Ridde & al., 2011) – the ex-
emption measures beneited poor households or people living 
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in remote villages. 
The “NGO effect” (a factor of 1.26) was found by compar-
ing the two implementations of free ACT provision, in the 
pilot project of Kangaba and country-wide as far as repre-
sented by Sélingué. The aim of the intervention was the same 
for both sets of actors: to supply RDTs and ACT medications 
free of charge, to train the CScom personnel in their use and 
management, and to make sure the local population was in-
formed about the innovation. Consequently, the NGO effect 
can be explained by the additional resources and greater in-
tensity of the intervention, with more widespread public in-
formation, more intensive supervision and training, and the 
elimination of drug stockouts. Given the prevalence of short-
ages in the public system, one might actually have expected 
the NGO effect to be even greater.
In Section 4.4 we applied the same NGO effect to total 
exemption, to estimate the increase achievable country-wide 
by the public system (Figure 6, left and center). As scaling up 
general fee exemption poses quantitatively a greater chal-
lenge than partial exemption, the NGO factor may turn out 
greater than 1.26 in this case; therefore, the overall effect es-
timates for country-wide implementation by the public sys-
tem (between 3.0 and 4.7 according to the point of departure) 
represent upper bounds. An effect estimate of total exemp-
tion on attendance in the absence of an NGO is crucial for the 
realistic planning of resource requirements for potential gov-
ernment interventions. Our estimates are certainly approxi-
mate but may turn out useful in the absence of alternative 
information. The estimates also assume, of course, that the 
total exemption measure will –in a context comparable to the 
districts of Kangaba and Sélingué– adopt similar strategies, 
notably as regards reimbursement of the management com-
mittees and incentives for the personnel.
To further illustrate the NGO effect, let’s look again at the 
effect of free ACT during low malaria transmission, observed 
only in presence of the NGO (Figure 5, right). This effect is 
astonishing, as the chance of beneiting from free ACT was 
even lower during this period: only 26% of the children had 
conirmed malaria (compared with 69% during the peak sea-
son, see Section 2.1). The fact that there was nonetheless an 
effect in the low season suggests that the presence of the 
NGO had a more general inluence: demand was increased 
despite the high risk of not beneiting from exemption. People 
must have been attracted by something else than inancial ac-
cessibility. We should ask what this is and if the public sys-
tem can provide it. One plausible explanation is a priori con-
idence in the quality of care due to the presence of external 
actors. No-one would expect the public health system to be 
able to organize, on a national scale, what the NGO was able 
to achieve in a single district, but there may be some elements 
that could be reproduced by the public system: for example, 
reliable forward management of drug stocks, the simpliica-
tion of manuals, or more effective public information on 
health service innovations.
The direct cost of the intervention (covering medical per-
sonnel, medications and running costs) for total exemption of 
payment for the treatment of under-ives in Group 1 came to 
an average of € 2.37 per consultation (US$ 3.24). The indi-
rect cost (for supervision and technical support, if entrusted 
to a local NGO), was estimated at € 1,240 for 1,000 consulta-
tions (US$ 1,695; Jouquet, 2008).
The NGO put in place a number of innovations within a 
relatively short time, with undeniable success. However, the 
NGO – as it itself admits (MSF, 2010) – could perhaps have 
communicated more with the district health management 
team, for example to identify feasible and reproducible ap-
proaches for a public health system under normal conditions. 
In the meantime, another NGO has taken over the task of 
providing free healthcare for under-ives in Kangaba district, 
and the Agents palu strategy was recently instated by the gov-
ernment, with UNICEF providing the salaries and the kits in 
2012.
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Appendix 1. Monthly numbers of under-ives consultations as reported by each CScom.
